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Survey Data and the Interest Rate Sensitivity
of US Bank Stock Returns
Harald A. Benink - Christian C. P. Wolff
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the interest rate
sensitivity of the stock returns of the twenty largest US bank holding
companies. The main contribution of the paper is the use of survey
data to model the unexpected interest rate variable, which is an
alternative approach to the existing literature. We ®nd evidence of
signi®cant negative interest rate sensitivity during the early 1980s,
and evidence of declining signi®cance in the late 1980s and early
1990s. This result is also obtained when using the forecast errors of
ARIMA processes to model the unexpected movement in the interest
rate.
1. Introduction
The interest rate sensitivity of US bank stock returns has been the research
topic of many academic papers. Most papers start from the two-index model
developed by Stone (1974). This asset pricing model expands the standard
market model of asset returns by adding an interest rate index. The function of
this interest rate factor is to account for the in¯uence of unexpected interest
rate changes on the stock returns of banks. Empirical research by, among
others, Fama and Schwert (1977) and Fogler et al. (1981) has shown that the
inclusion of an interest-rate factor adds substantial explanatory power to the
single-factor market model.
A group of papers combining years from the 1970s and 1980s into one
data set ®nd that US bank stocks exhibit a statistically signi®cant inverse
relationship between unanticipated interest-rate changes and the returns on
these stocks (Flannery and James, 1984; Brewer and Lee, 1985; Scott and
Peterson, 1986; Kane and Unal, 1988; Saunders and Yourougou, 1990;
Yourougou, 1990; Kwan, 1991; Akella and Greenbaum, 1992; Choi et al.,
1992). This result is not qualitatively in¯uenced by the choice of a short-term
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Board for helpful comments. Any remaining errors are our responsibility alone.or long-term interest rate variable. Neither is it qualitatively in¯uenced by the
size of the banks: large money-centre banks, middle-sized super-regional
banks, or smaller regional banks. There is also a group of papers containing
data sets only covering the 1970s or allowing us to focus on subsets of data
covering only the 1970s (Chance and Lane, 1980; Sweeney and Warga, 1986;
Kane and Unal, 1988; Choi et al., 1992). These papers ®nd an insigni®cant
interest rate sensitivity during the 1970s. This result is not counter-intuitive
given the fact that, on 6 October 1979, the Federal Reserve Board announced a
switch from interest rates to unborrowed reserves as its short-term operating
target, which led to an increase in the level and variability of interest rates.
However, Saunders and Yourougou (1990) and Yourougou (1990) still ®nd
signi®cant interest rate sensitivity for the period October 1977 to September
1979. In recent papers, Allen and Jagtiani (1997) and Choi et al. (1996)
present evidence of declining signi®cance of interest rate sensitivity in the late
1980s and early 1990s. Both sets of authors link this decline to the availability
of interest rate derivatives contracts for hedging purposes. Another paper
incorporating recent data is Robinson (1995). Robinson employed quarterly
data in contrast to the weekly data in our analysis. His results are quite mixed
in the sense that the sign of the interest rate sensitivity appears to depend on
the choice of the interest rate variable in his time series models.
The contribution of this paper to the literature is twofold. First, employing
weekly data for the period 1974±93 and using the forecast errors of autore-
gressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) processes to model the unex-
pected interest rate, we provide empirical evidence on the interest rate
sensitivity of the stock returns of the twenty largest US bank holding
companies. As in most previous studies, we do not ®nd statistically signi®cant
interest rate sensitivity during the 1970s, strong evidence of negative interest
rate sensitivity during the early 1980s, and evidence of declining signi®cance
in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This result is qualitatively independent of
using the three-month Treasury bill rate or the rate on ten-year Treasury bonds
as input for the ARIMA modelling of the unexpected interest rate variable.
The second and main contribution of this paper is to use survey data to
model the unexpected interest rate variable.1 This is an alternative approach
compared to the existing literature. Flannery and James (1984) and Robinson
(1995) use the forecast errors of an autoregressive (AR) model as a proxy for
unexpected interest rate movements. Scott and Peterson (1986), Sweeney and
Warga (1986) and Kane and Unal (1988) use changes in the yield on a given
maturity of long-term government bonds to capture unanticipated changes in
interest rates. Finally, Mishkin (1982) and Brewer and Lee (1985) proxy
unanticipated changes in interest rates by the difference between the spot
three-month Treasury bill rate at time t and the forward three-month Treasury
1 We would like to thank Kees Koedijk for bringing this possibility to our attention.
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weekly survey data on the US federal funds rate for the period 29 April 1980
to 22 December 1993. The survey was conducted by Money Market Services
(MMS) International (part of Standard & Poor's) in Belmont, California. The
weekly surveys generate a market expectation for the federal funds rate for a
certain survey period which is then confronted with the realized value of the
federal funds rate during the same survey period. This enables us to calculate
an unexpected movement in the federal funds rate for the relevant survey
period which is then used for estimating the interest-rate sensitivity in the two-
index model.
Survey forecasts of interest rates have been studied in the literature. Some
prominent references are the earlier work by Friedman (1979, 1980) and the
somewhat more recent results of Froot (1989). Survey forecasts are an
interesting alternative for the use of ARIMA model forecasts, among other
things, because, unlike the ARIMA forecasts, they are intrinsically forward
looking. Also, many studies indicate that standard time-invariant time series
models simply cannot be viewed as adequate representations of relatively
complex interest rate processes. Using an extensive dataset covering the period
1969±86, Froot (1989) ®nds little evidence that expected future short rates
under-react to current short-rate changes. He could not reject the hypothesis
that the market's expectation of future short rates is rational. With regard to
longer-term interest rates, Froot ®nds expectational biases in the survey data.
The behaviour of the expectational errors suggests that expected future rates
under-react to changes in the short rate. As in many other studies, Froot (1989)
rejects the expectations theory of the interest rate. Time series and survey
approaches each have their own advantages and drawbacks. This makes it
interesting to explore both avenues in empirical work.
In our empirical analysis using survey data, we ®nd a statistically signi®-
cant negative interest rate sensitivity for the period 1980±84. Since then, the
statistically signi®cant relation between unexpected federal funds rate changes
and bank stock returns has broken down. This result is consistent with our
previous ®ndings where we used the forecast errors of ARIMA processes
related to the three-month Treasury bill rate and the ten-year Treasury bond
rate as a proxy for unanticipated interest rate movements. Also, in the latter
case, we found a breakdown of the interest rate sensitivities during the second
half of the 1980s.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our model and
data selection. Section 3 contains our empirical analysis for the period 1974±
93 using the forecast errors of ARIMA processes for the US three-month
Treasury bill rate and ten-year Treasury bond rate as proxies for the unex-
pected interest rate variable. Section 4 contains our empirical ®ndings using
survey data for the expected US federal funds rate. In section 5, concluding
this paper, we interpret the breakdown of the statistical signi®cance of the
interest rate sensitivity during the second half of the 1980s.
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We start the analysis from the two-index model developed by Stone
(1974). This asset pricing model expands the standard market model of asset
returns by adding an interest rate index. In this model Rp, being the return on
asset p, is expressed as
Rpt  â0  âmRmt  âiRit  ept (1)
âm and âi are measures of the asset's systematic market and interest rate risk,
while Rm and Ri represent a stock market return and a return on debt.2 Because
of the observed moving-average pattern in the regression errors, the following
empirical version of the model is estimated:
Rpt  â0  âmRmt  âiRit  ept  èe ptÿ1
Here, è is a ®rst-order moving average parameter.
In our sample, we have chosen for the return on the S&P500 composite
index as a proxy for the stock market return Rm. The variable Rp is the return
on an equally weighted portfolio of the common stocks of the twenty largest
US bank holding companies. The data were corrected for stock-splits. Ri serves
as the variable indicating the unexpected interest rate movement on govern-
ment debt.
In the following, we will elaborate on the choices of data and methodology
in our empirical analysis for both the ARIMA and the survey data modelling
of the unexpected interest rate variable.
2.1. Unexpected Interest Rate Generated as Forecast Error of an ARIMA
Process
For a period of twenty years (1974±93), we calculate weekly returns for
the S&P500 composite index, the individual bank stocks, and the equally
weighted bank index consisting of the twenty individual bank stocks. The
weekly data, retrieved from Datastream, cover the periods from the closing
value at a Wednesday until the closing value on the next Wednesday.
For both the three-month Treasury bill rate data and the ten-year Treasury
bond rate data, obtained from the H15 release of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, we estimate ARIMA processes. The calculations
cover the same weekly periods as those used for the calculations of stock
returns.
For each interest rate variable, we selected two processes, one based upon
the Akaike lag-length selection criterion and the other based upon the Schwarz
2 Following Kane and Unal (1988), we employ the unorthogonalized two-index model. This
means that no orthogonalization is used between Rm and Ri.
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by the estimation of the optimal ARIMA processes are considered as the best
approximation of the unexpected interest rate movement. These residuals are
then used as Ri in our model.
2.2. Unexpected Interest Rate Generated as Forecast Error of Survey Data
For a period of about 13.5 years (29 April 1980 until 22 December 1993),
we use weekly survey data on the US federal funds rate. The weekly survey
were conducted by MMS International (part of S&P) in Belmont, California.
The methodology of the survey was changed in November 1987 which
prompted us to split the 1980±93 data set into two distinct survey periods.
From 29 April 1980 until 30 October 1987, the weekly surveys were
conducted on a week/next week basis. This implies that individual market
participants were asked to formulate their expectation for the federal funds rate
for the next week, i.e. for the coming ®ve trading days. Moreover, the survey
did not ask for the expected value of the federal funds rate at the end of the
coming ®ve trading days, but required individual market participants to give
their average expected value of the federal funds rate for the next ®ve trading
days. The average federal funds rate expectations of the individual market
participants were then combined into one market expectation for the average
value of the federal funds rate during the next ®ve trading days by taking the
median of the individual expected values.
In our sample, we confront the average value expected by the market for
the next ®ve trading days with the realized average value of the federal funds
rate for the same ®ve trading days. By subtracting the realized average value
from the expected average value, we construct a variable indicating the
unexpected average federal funds rate during the next ®ve trading days. This
variable then becomes the Ri in our model. For reasons of consistency, we also
compute average returns on the equally weighted bank index (Rp) and the
S&P500 composite index (Rm). Moreover, these average returns are calculated
in such a way that they exactly match the periods of ®ve trading days on which
the survey expectations are based.
Starting from 29 April 1980, the surveys were conducted on Tuesdays and
were related to the next ®ve trading days (Wednesday through Tuesday).
However, on 17 February 1984, the survey day was changed to Friday so that
the surveys covered Monday through Friday as the next ®ve trading days. In
our sample, we took this change into account when we calculated Rp, Rm and
Ri.
Sometimes, the survey was conducted one day later than usual, e.g. during
1980±84 not on the regular Tuesday but on the Wednesday just after this
Tuesday. In these cases, the survey expectation is related to the next four (and
not ®ve) trading days. For these particular cases, we computed Rp, Rm and Ri
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survey was conducted one, two or three days earlier than the regular survey
day. In these cases, the survey expectations still cover a period of ®ve days.
However, the survey periods are not the next ®ve trading days immediately
following the earlier survey days, but still the next ®ve trading days as if the
surveys had been conducted on the regular days and not on the earlier days.
Starting 6 November 1987, the weekly surveys were no longer on a week/
next week basis but were related to the two-week Federal Reserve Board's
reserve maintenance period beginning on a Thursday and ending on a Wednes-
day, two weeks later. The weekly surveys still took place on Fridays. However,
market participants were no longer asked for the average expected value of the
federal funds rate during the remaining trading days of the maintenance period,
but they were asked to give the expected value of the federal funds rate on the
Wednesday at the end of the two-week maintenance period.
Because the weekly surveys are now related to a Wednesday occurring
once every two weeks, we are confronted with survey expectations covering
different numbers of days. The surveys conducted on the ®rst Friday of the
two-week maintenance period require market participants to give their expecta-
tions for a period of twelve days (eight trading days) ahead, while the surveys
on the second Friday of the same maintenance period cover an expectation
period of ®ve days (three trading days) ahead. To deal with this phenomenon in
an adequate way, we split the November 1987±December 1993 sample into
two subsamples. The ®rst subsample uses the expectations for the federal funds
rate eight trading days ahead. By subtracting the realized value of the federal
funds rate at the end of the eight trading days (corresponding to the Wednesday
ending the maintenance period) from the expected value based on the survey,
we are able to compute the unexpected federal funds rate at the end of the next
eight trading days. This variable then becomes the Ri in our model. For reasons
of consistency, we also compute the end-of-period returns on the equally
weighted bank index (Rp) and the S&P500 composite index (Rm). Moreover,
these end-of-period returns are calculated in such a way that they exactly
match the periods of eight trading days on which the survey expectations are
based. For the second subsample, which contains the expectations for the
federal funds rate three trading days ahead, we follow exactly the same
methodology. Naturally, all variables are constructed for the relevant three
days. Like for the 1980±87 period, we corrected our data set for surveys not
conducted on the regular Fridays, but on an earlier or later day.
3. The Period 1974±93 using ARIMA Processes
In this section, we present our results on the interest rate sensitivity of US
bank stock returns using time series processes to generate unexpected interest
rates. ARIMA models are estimated for both three-month Treasury bills and
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Akaike and Schwarz lag-length selection criteria. As the interest rate sensitiv-
ity results are quite similar for the two selection criteria, we only report results
obtained using the Schwarz criterion. The estimation results for equation (1)
are presented in Table 1. To address the serial correlation that is present in the
residuals in a number of cases, we have allowed for a ®rst-order moving
average in the residuals, where appropriate. This moving average appears to
capture the error term dynamics satisfactorily.
The empirical results in Table 1 are presented for the whole sample period as
well as for three subperiods. Our choice of subperiods corresponds closely to
the subperiods investigated by Flannery et al. (1997), who studied the
subperiods 1973±78, 1979±84 and 1985±90. Note that we chose to start our
second subperiod directly after the change in operating procedures by the
Federal Reserve Board on 6 October 1979, and that our somewhat longer third
subperiod extends through 1993. To be precise, subperiod 1 of our weekly data
covers 2 January 1974±3 October 1979, subperiod 2 covers 10 October 1979±
26 December 1984 and subperiod 3 covers 2 January 1985±29 December
1993.
From Table 1, we can infer that our results are quite robust to the choice
of the interest rate variable. In both cases, i.e. for the short-term and long-term
Table 1: Regression Results on the Interest Rate Sensitivity of Bank Stock Returns, 1974±93,
using ARIMA models









































































Notes: t statistics are reported in parentheses; () indicates statistical signi®cance at the 5% (1%) level.
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Robinson's (1995) results. For the whole period, the standard result of negative
interest rate sensitivity of bank stock returns obtains. Interestingly, analysis of
the subperiod results reveals that negative interest rate sensitivity is entirely
concentrated in the second subperiod (1979±84), in which the sensitivity is
very signi®cantly present. In the 1974±79 period no signi®cant interest rate
sensitivity is present and, in the 1985±93 period, the signi®cant interest rate
sensitivity disappears again. Returns on bank stocks appear to react differently
to interest rate movements in different periods.
4. The Period 1980±93 using Survey Data
This section is devoted to the empirical results on the interest rate
sensitivity of bank stock returns when survey data are used to determine
unexpected interest rates. Because of variation in the survey methodology, as
described above, we report results for two separate survey periods: 1980±87
and 1987±93.
Results for the ®rst survey period are reported in the top half of Table 2. The
results for the entire 1980±87 period indicate that no signi®cant interest rate
sensitivity is present. When the period is subdivided, again following Flannery
et al. (1997), it becomes apparent that interest rate sensitivity is signi®cantly
present in the subperiod 1980±85, but not in the subperiod 1985±87. This
corresponds with our ®ndings based upon ARIMA models in section 3 above.
Our results for the second survey period, 1987±93, are reported in the
lower half of Table 2. The results for the two subsamples based on eight-
Table 2: Regression Results on the Interest Rate Sensitivity of Bank Stock Returns, 1980±93,
using Interest Survey Data
â0 âm âi è R2 #obs.













































Notes: t statistics are reported in parentheses; () indicates statistical signi®cance at the 5% (1%) level.
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reported separately.3 No signi®cant interest rate sensitivity is present here.
5. Interpretation and Conclusion
Employing weekly data for the entire 1974±93 sample and using the
forecast errors of ARIMA processes to model the unexpected interest rate, we
provide empirical evidence on the interest rate sensitivity of the stock returns
of the twenty largest US bank holding companies. As in most previous studies,
we do not ®nd statistically signi®cant interest rate sensitivity during the 1970s,
strong evidence of negative interest rate sensitivity during the early 1980s, and
evidence of declining signi®cance in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The latter
result is also obtained when we use survey data to model the unexpected
interest rate.
On 6 October 1979 the Federal Reserve Board announced a switch from
interest rates to unborrowed reserves as its short-term operating target, which
led to an increase in the level and variability of interest rates. In our empirical
analysis, we use this event as the switching date for the signi®cant change in
the interest rate sensitivity of the stock returns of the twenty largest US bank
holding companies. The latter is consistent with Aharony et al. (1986) who
published a study on the October 1979 event in which they showed that after
the monetary policy switch, banks started to experience signi®cant interest rate
sensitivity.
Our empirical results for the 1980s show a breakdown of the statistically
signi®cant interest rate sensisitivity of US bank stock returns during the second
half of the 1980s. This result is qualitatively independent of the methodology
chosen for modelling the unexpected interest rate variable: both the ARIMA
and survey approaches generate this result.
We believe, given our previous remarks, that the breakdown of interest
rate sensitivity of US bank stock returns can be viewed as a process which
developed gradually and became signi®cantly visible during the second half of
the 1980s.4 The increase of interest rates due to the October 1979 event caused
many insolvencies of savings and loan (S&L) associations. These S&Ls found
themselves locked into negative interest margins (low ®xed rates on the assets
side and high ¯oating rates on the liabilities side). The S&L crisis led to an
increase of interest rate risk awareness on the part of bankers and regulators. A
gradual process of an increasing professionalization of interest rate risk
management by banks started. Part of this process was a shift in the composi-
3 The estimation results for the three-trading-days-ahead expectations were generated by
omitting one outlier. Hamilton (1996) notes that `spectacular outliers' are quite common for federal
funds rate data.
4 We would like to thank George Kaufman for suggesting this interpretation.
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Moreover, hedging of interest rate risk became easier and cheaper because of
the explosive growth of derivatives markets trading interest rate futures and
options. In particular for the largest banks, as in our study where we focus on
the twenty largest US bank holding companies, access to these derivatives
markets is easy and immediate. Smaller-sized banks are likely to experience
more dif®culty in using derivatives for hedging interest rate risk, resulting in
different conclusions with respect to interest rate sensitivity (Elyasiani and
Mansur, 1998). The largest banks started to limit the amount of interest rate
risk they were willing to accept and to reduce their sensitivity to unexpected
interest rate movements.
An interesting alternative interpretation (Flannery et al., 1997) is that lack
of variation in the interest rate in the second half of the 1980s makes any
hypothesis about interest rate sensitivity hard to reject. Besides that, the late
1980s and early 1990s were a period of `reregulation' of the banking system:
the Competitive Equality in Banking Act (CEBA) in 1987, the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) in 1989, and
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) in
1991. The reregulation implied a decrease in bank beta instability (Brooks et
al., 1997), even if it had a low impact on the risk taking behaviour by banks
(Galloway et al., 1997).
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Non-technical summary
In this paper, we provide empirical evidence on the interest rate sensitivity
of the stock returns of the twenty largest US bank holding companies. The
main contribution of the paper is the use of survey data to model the
unexpected interest rate variable, which is an alternative approach to the
existing literature. Most existing studies use ARIMA models to capture
expected and unexpected components of interest rates. Speci®cally, we use
weekly surveys conducted by Money Market Services (MMS) on the federal
funds rate. The survey measure enables us to calculate an unexpected move-
ment in the federal funds rate during the survey period, which is then used to
estimate interest rate sensitivity in a two-index model. Survey forecasts are an
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intrinsically forward looking. Also, many studies indicate that standard time-
invariant time series models simply cannot be viewed as adequate representa-
tions of relatively complex interest rate processes. We ®nd evidence of signi®-
cant negative interest rate sensitivity during the early 1980s, and evidence of
declining signi®cance in the late 1980s and early 1990s. This result is also
obtained when using the forecast errors of ARIMA processes to model the
unexpected movement in the interest rate, which adds to the robustness of the
results. We believe that the breakdown of interest sensitivity of US bank stock
returns can be viewed as a process that developed gradually and became visible
during the second half of the 1980s, re¯ecting an increasing professionaliza-
tion of interest rate risk management. Also, hedging of interest rate risk
became easier and cheaper because of the explosive growth of derivatives
markets trading interest rate futures and options. An interesting alternative
hypothesis is that lack of variation in the interest rate in the second half of the
1980s made any hypothesis about interest sensitivity hard to reject.
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